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Abstract 
Ernst Mach’s defense of relativist theories of motion in Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung 
involves a well-known criticism of Newton’s theory appealing to absolute space, and of 
Newton’s “bucket” experiment in particular. Sympathetic readers including Norton 
(1995) and critics including Stein (1967, 1977) agree that there is a tension in Mach’s 
view: he allows for some constructed scientific concepts, but not others, and some kinds of 
reasoning about unobserved phenomena, but not others. Following Banks (2003), I argue 
that this tension can be interpreted as a constructive one, as springing from Mach’s basic 
approach to scientific reasoning. Mach’s reasoning about the “economy of science” allows 
for a principled distinction to be made, between natural and artificial hypothetical 
reasoning. Finally, Mach defends a division of labor between the sciences in a paper for 
The Monist of 1903, “Space and Geometry from the Point of View of Physical Inquiry”. 
That division supports counterfactual reasoning in Mach’s system, something that’s long 
been denied is possible for him.   
1. Debating Mach’s Principle: Empiricism, Counterfactual Reasoning, and Economy
2. A Division of Labor within Mach’s Economy of Science




1. Debating Mach’s Principle: Empiricism, Counterfactual Reasoning, and 
Economy 
The history of Mach’s Principle has been tied closely to the history of the theory of relativity, and 
thus, more broadly, to the history of relativistic theories of motion. On relativistic theories, a 
body in motion must be in motion relative to some other body, and not to absolute space. As 
Norton notes, acceleration often is a “stumbling block” for relativistic theories.2 For instance, in 
the “two spheres” thought experiment, two spheres are separated by a string. The spheres rotate 
around each other. When they are rotating quickly with respect to each other, the string is taut. 
When the spheres slow down, the string slackens. The string reflects the existence of a force. But 
on a relativistic theory, since the two spheres are rotating only with respect to each other, there is 
nothing with respect to which the entire two sphere system is rotating. But if the system is not in 
motion with respect to any body outside it, then what is the source of the tension on the string?  
In Mach’s comments on Newton’s reasoning, in the famous ‘bucket experiment’, Mach criticizes 
Newton’s appeal to absolute space and time. Newton argues that the centrifugal force in the 
bucket experiment, and the force on the string in the two spheres experiment, result from the 
rotation of the bucket and the spheres with respect to absolute space. Mach asserts three things in 
response: (1) that “no one is competent to predicate things about absolute space and absolute 
motion”, since these are not facts but creatures of thought,3 (2) that the water in Newton’s bucket, 
or the two rotating spheres) could be rotating with respect to some more distant inertial frame, 
such as the fixed stars; and (3) that the physicist’s task in evaluating these experiments is to 
analyze the facts before her, and not “arbitrary fictions of the imagination”.4 Mach concludes 
that “the phenomena of centrifugal forces compel us not to postulate an absolute reference-
system but to recognize the law of inertia as a mere empirical generalization about the motions of 
bodies relative to the fixed stars”.5   
On Norton’s reading, Mach’s principle is that “the motion of a body is caused entirely by an 
interaction with other bodies” (op. cit., p. 10).  While Mach himself did not formulate this 
principle, scientists after him, most famously Einstein, took it as a methodological or physical 
principle. Moritz Schlick appears to have been among the first to formulate the principle. He 
“referred to Mach’s general proposal for a relativity of all motion, from which, Schlick noted, it 
follows that ‘the cause of inertia must be assumed to be an interaction of masses’”.6 Thus, prima 
facie, we may read Mach’s principle either as a simple statement of a relativist theory of motion, 
or as a physical statement about the cause of inertia.  
Since its formulation, the principle has been controversial. One set of views of its significance 
appeals to Mach’s so-called “phenomenalism”. On this reading, which we can attribute to 
Howard Stein and others, Mach is guilty of an “abusive empiricism” that sets unreasonable 
criteria for scientific reasoning. All conceptual or formal notions used in science must be 
observable, a requirement Stein finds unreasonable.  
Another view, found in Norton (1995), is more sympathetic. On Norton’s reading, Mach’s 
criticism of Newton is not intended to lay out a new physical argument or mechanism. Rather, 
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Mach intended only to redescribe Newton’s experiments without the term “space,” which had an 
indeterminate meaning. He did not intend to give a causal argument or mechanism. As Norton 
points out, this reading leads to a puzzle. If Mach didn’t intend to give a causal argument, why 
does he accept without comment the many people who said, in his presence or in works he read, 
that he did? 
As Norton points out, though, what Mach meant by a “causal” argument was simply a functional 
dependence between two observed variables (Norton, op. cit., pp. 27-29). In the case of the bucket 
experiment, that functional dependence can be captured by pointing out that centrifugal forces 
are produced by the relative rotation of the water in the bucket with respect to “the masses of the 
earth and the other celestial bodies”.7 
As Norton notes, even with this heroic save, the original puzzle remains. Einstein wrote to Mach 
saying that “inertia has its origins in a kind of interaction of bodies, quite in the sense of your 
reflections on Newton’s bucket experiment” (cited in Norton, op. cit., p. 29). But on Norton’s 
reading, Mach’s reflections quite deliberately didn’t amount to a general claim about inertia or 
its sources. Rather, they amount to a re-description of the bucket experiment itself without using 
the notion of “space” to explain the origins of inertia. As Norton points out, “Einstein’s notion of 
causal interaction extended well beyond the simple functional relations of phenomena. It 
included relations on hypothetical and counterfactual systems of precisely the type denounced by 
Mach” (op. cit., p. 29).  
Here, there is an unexpected agreement between Stein’s critical and Norton’s sympathetic 
reading. As DiSalle summarizes Stein’s position, 
Stein characterized Mach’s philosophical opposition to Newton as “abusive 
empiricism”—meaning by this not merely the prejudice against theories involving 
unobservable entities or far-reaching counterfactual implications, but, more important, 
the absurd willingness to accept empirically unmotivated hypotheses about cosmic 
geography, boundary conditions, and so on, just to avoid theories of that sort.8 
Stein makes a point closely related to Norton’s: that Mach’s pronouncements on hypothetical 
reasoning seem inconsistent.  
Mach’s opposition to the kinetic-molecular theory is based upon the fact that, as he puts it, 
atoms are “mental artifices.” But what about perfectly ordinary objects? “Ordinary 
matter,” Mach says, is a “highly natural, unconsciously constructed mental symbol for a 
relatively stable complex of sensational elements”; the only distinction he finds to the 
disadvantage of atoms is that of the “natural unconscious construction” versus the 
“artificial hypothetical” one. To conclude, as Mach does, on the basis of this distinction, 
that atomic theories should eventually he replaced by some “more naturally attained” 
substitute is is very strange: not only is the argument at right angles to Mach's view of the 
“economic” objective of science, it actually accords a preference to the instinctive and 
unconscious over the conceptual and deliberate mental processes.9 
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On the one hand, Mach seems to be arguing that “artificial entities” like “absolute space”, 
“atoms”, and the like are to be eliminated from physical reasoning.  On the other hand, Mach 
appears willing to accept “empirically unmotivated” claims about cosmic boundary conditions, 
the global conditions of matter, and the like, in order to avoid absolute space and the atomic 
theory.  
Moreover, as Norton observes, Mach does not object to Einstein’s interpretation of Mach’s 
reasoning about the bucket experiment. But Einstein’s interpretation has it that Mach is making 
a general point about the origins of inertial forces, which implies that Mach is making a strong 
causal claim beyond functional dependence. That stronger claim involves hypothetical and 
counterfactual reasoning that is supposed to be anti-Machian.  
The accounts of Norton and Stein suggest a criticism of Mach. Mach uses his well-known 
reasoning about the “naturalness” of concepts and the “economy” of science to oppose concepts 
like absolute space and atoms. But when it is a matter of his own preferred concepts or results, 
like ordinary matter, global boundary conditions, or the origins of inertial force, Mach appears 
willing to violate his own criteria. Those criteria then appear to be ad hoc, not scientific. That is 
why Stein calls Mach’s empiricism “abusive”: from a Newtonian perspective, Mach is picking 
and choosing which “conceptual monsters” he will allow within his system, and violating his own 
criteria to do so. And, as we’ve seen, Norton agrees that Mach’s position appears internally 
inconsistent in this way.  
 
2. A Division of Labor within Mach’s Economy of Science  
If your friends and your foes agree that you have a fault, it may be that you do have that fault. 
Or, it may be that, despite the heroic efforts even of your sympathetic readers, there is still some 
misunderstanding.  
To a certain extent, Mach has been misunderstood. But the misunderstanding stems, not from 
his physics, but from his account of the “economy of science”,  found in Mach’s work The 
Development of Mechanics, Presented Historico-Critically.10 This work is the site of, and crucial context 
for, Mach’s interpretation of Newton’s bucket experiment.  
A thorough reading of The Development of Mechanics leads one to question the usual reading of 
Mach on the economy of science. According to that reading, Mach argues that the “principles” 
of mechanics, like the principles of least action or of the straightest path, are “economical” in the 
sense that they allow for computational efficiency or ease of memory. Many scientific results are 
encapsulated in the least action principle, for instance, but humans don’t have memories that can 
store and recall all of those results with ease. But the least action principle takes a few minutes to 
memorize. Moreover, it encapsulates more results. Thus, if the principle is used in an inference, 
it allows for more computational power: we can more easily determine what is derivable from 
what.  
I don’t disagree with this interpretation as a partial reading of Mach on the economy of science. 
However, Mach’s account is much richer than this. Mach presents the economy of science, not 
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just as a static set of principles that allow us to compute more easily, but also as a system that 
develops over time. That system is dynamic. Certain ways of proceeding will promote the 
economy of science, while certain others will detract from it.  
Typology of the Economy of Science 
Methods that Promote Economy The Effects of These Methods 
“Instinctive knowledge” Transparency  
The method of differences Empirical fruitfulness 
The law of continuity of experience The ability to disregard details 
Relations of the whole Computational power 
 Minimization 
 Completion of experience 
One can identify ten elements in The Development of Mechanics relevant to the economy of science. 
The elements on the left hand side of the chart above, the “methods”, are ways to promote the 
economy of science. The elements on the right hand side, the “effects”, are results of employing 
these methods. Computational power, according to this chart, should be seen not (just) as an 
absolute property of a principle of science, but as the result of employing an economical method.  
One example of an economical method is the “method of differences”, which Mach discusses in 
his lecture “On the Conservation of Energy”. Experience teaches us that some sensed elements of 
the world are interdependent - pressure, volume, and heat in a gas, for example. But there are 
differences as well as dependence. 
Facts may be so nearly related as to contain the same kind of [elements], but the relation 
be such that the [elements] of the one differ from the [elements] of the other only by the 
number of equal parts into which they can be divided ... if rules can be given for deducing 
from one another the numbers which are the measures of these [elements], then we 
possess in such rules the most general expression of a group of facts ... This is the goal of 
quantitative investigation… what we have found is that between the [elements] of a group 
of facts ... a number of equations exists. The simple fact of change brings it about that the 
number of these equations must be smaller than the number of the [elements]. If the 
former be smaller by one than the latter, then one portion of the [elements] is uniquely 
determined by the other portion.11 
Theories should be analyzed in terms of their observable “elements”.12 The goal of science is to 
show that some elements of a theory (variables such as pressure and volume) are dependent on 
other elements of the theory (variables such as motion and density). To show that the 
independent group is smaller than the dependent group is to promote economy in science. Mach 
calls this the “method of differences”. As Banks notes, 
The tension between the [observed] elements and their ordering into this general 
manifold of space, time, and matter is a general problem in Mach's philosophy of nature. 
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The divide falls between his heraclitean view that the elements are transitory unique 
events, arising and vanishing and possessing always an individual existence, and his view 
that space, time, and matter, however unreal they may be on a fundamental level, 
represent for Mach economical permanencies that must be acknowledged as a task of 
science...  Mach said that he considered the real facts of nature to be the existence of 
“differences” or inequalities... Mach’s elements are the differences of state in the world 
and, by a careful tracking of their effects on one another, the determinations of the rates 
and magnitudes of those effects, Mach thought one could deduce the existence of 
independent potential sources and relations of intensity from this raw data by finding 
orderings in it.13 
The tension Banks notes, between “transitory unique events, arising and vanishing and 
possessing always an individual existence”, and “his view that space, time, and matter, however 
unreal they may be on a fundamental level, represent for Mach economical permanencies”, is 
precisely the tension identified by Norton and Stein as a problem for Mach. But Norton and 
Stein see the tension as a problem in a negative sense: as an inconsistency, or as an un-scientific 
element in Mach’s view. On Banks’s reading, we can see the tension as a “problem” in a positive 
sense: one aim of science is to resolve the tension between transitory world-elements that are 
experienced only once, and the “economical permanencies” of space, time, matter, and the like.  
Concepts like space, time, and matter can be economical in distinct ways. In The Development of 
Mechanics, Mach provides a thoroughgoing, if disjointed, account of how the economy of science 
is promoted. And this account can serve as a way to explain why, for him, some concepts can be 
used to support hypothetical systems and counterfactual reasoning, and some should not. Such 
an explanation will not make all of Mach’s stated positions consistent.  But it will clear up the 
question, asked by Norton, Stein, and others, of why Mach seemed to allow for such reasoning in 
some cases and not in others.  
Stein argues that  
Mach says, in a famous and true remark, that the world is given to us only once, and he 
concludes that it is “not permitted to us to say how things would be” if the world were to 
be other than it is… But Mach does not make it a general rule for science that in every 
statement based upon experience there should appear a list of all the circumstances over 
which we have no control (the universe being given only once), in order to avoid seeming 
to claim that we know that the statement would continue to be true even if these things 
were otherwise.  Such a rule would not only grievously violate Mach’s “economy of 
thought”, it would make science impossible (op. cit. 1977, p. 15). 
It’s rare, fortunately, to have the dreadful responsibility of contradicting Howard Stein. Even so, 
Mach does make it a general rule for science that we cannot neglect the rest of the world even 
when concentrating only on two observed facts or elements.  
even in the simplest case, in which apparently we deal with the mutual action of only two 
masses, the neglecting of the rest of the world is impossible. Nature does not begin with 
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elements, as we are obliged to begin with them. It is certainly fortunate for us, that we can, 
from time to time, turn aside our eyes from the overpowering unity of the whole, and 
allow them to rest on individual details. But we should not neglect ultimately to complete 
and to correct our views by a thorough consideration of the things which for the time 
being we left out of account… In fact, science can accomplish nothing by the 
consideration of individual facts: from time to time it must cast its glance at the world as a 
whole. Galileo's laws of falling bodies, Huygens's principle of vis viva, the principle of 
virtual velocities, nay, even the concept of mass, could not, as we saw, be obtained, except 
by the alternate consideration of individual facts and of nature as a totality.14 
As we learn from Banks, the tension between the elements, the heraclitean world “given only 
once,” and the consideration of “nature as a totality” is a fundamental problem for Mach’s 
account of science. But it is a problem that Mach sees as one we must try to solve, and he thinks 
that the framework of a solution must be built into science itself.  
Mach’s “law of continuity of experience” is a crucial element of that framework. This “law” is in 
fact more of a method or rule.  It states that any principle of mechanics must be considered, not 
as a universal and necessary proposition, but as an assertion that is being checked constantly by 
experience.  
The most important result of our investigations is that precisely the apparently simplest 
mechanical principles are of a very complicated character, that these principles are 
founded on uncompleted experiences, nay on experiences that never can be fully 
completed, that practically, indeed, they are sufficiently secured, in view of the tolerable 
stability of our environment, to serve as the foundation of mathematical deduction, but 
that they can by no means themselves be regarded as mathematically established truths 
but only as principles that not only admit of constant control by experience but also 
require it (op. cit., 1883, pp. 237-8). 
The law of continuity is the basis of Mach’s reasoning about the “completion” of experience 
through science, one of the products of the economy of science.  
The function of science, as we take it, is to replace experience. Thus, on the one hand, 
science must remain in the province of experience, but, on the other, must hasten beyond 
it, constantly expecting confirmation, constantly expecting the reverse. Where neither 
confirmation nor refutation is possible, science is not concerned. Science acts and acts 
only in the domain of uncompleted experience. Exemplars of such branches of science are 
the theories of elasticity and of the conduction of heat, both of which ascribe to the 
smallest particles of matter only such properties as observation supplies in the study of the 
larger portions. The comparison of theory and experience may be farther and farther 
extended, as our means of observation increase in refinement (op. cit., 1883, p. 490). 
This passage alone contradicts the reading of Mach as a reductive phenomenalist or as an 
“abusive empiricist” about science. Neither would suggest that science “must hasten beyond” 
experience. Neither would suggest, either, that science “acts and acts only in the domain of 
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uncompleted experience”. Certainly, Mach says that our completion of experience is based on 
observed properties and relations.  But, immediately following this passage, Mach explains that 
those observed properties and relations can be supplemented, and even can be hypothetical: 
When we mentally add to those actions of a human being which we can perceive, 
sensations and ideas like our own which we cannot perceive, the object of the idea we so 
form is economical. The idea makes experience intelligible to us; it supplements and 
supplants experience. This idea is not regarded as a great scientific discovery, only 
because its formation is so natural that every child conceives it. Now, this is exactly what 
we do when we imagine a moving body which has just disappeared behind a pillar, or a 
comet at the moment invisible, as continuing its motion and retaining its previously 
observed properties. We do this that we may not be surprised by its reappearance. We fill 
out the gaps in experience by the ideas that experience suggests.15 
From Mach’s statements thus far, we can make a distinction fundamental to his economy of 
science, between natural and artificial hypothetical reasoning. The distinction is not found in 
Mach himself, but it is, I believe, a minor and straightforward inference from his own account.  
Natural hypothetical reasoning “fills out the gaps in experience by the ideas that 
experience suggests” with “sensations and ideas like our own”.  
Artificial hypothetical reasoning either: 
(a) Does not merely fill in gaps in experience, but rather postulates a speculative kind of 
experience, or  
(b) Uses sensations and ideas that do not resemble our own to assemble speculative systems.  
The application of this distinction to Newton’s bucket, and to the two spheres experiment, is 
clear. If we appeal to the “fixed stars” or to global boundary conditions that can be cashed out in 
terms of observations like our own, then we are engaging in natural hypothetical reasoning. We 
are filling in the gaps of experience, but with experiences that we ourselves could have had. On 
Mach’s reading, if we appeal to Newtonian absolute space and time, then we must construct a 
speculative hypothetical system based on the sensorium of God. Such an appeal does not fill in 
gaps in human experience – it goes outside any possible human experience.16 Newton’s account 
of the bucket experiment is artificial hypothetical reasoning, according to this distinction.  
The first conclusion for which I want to argue is that, with a deeper understanding of Mach’s 
economy of science, the vicious tension identified by Stein and Norton can become the more 
virtuous tension identified by Banks. The question, for Mach, is how to fill out the gaps left by a 
mere description of observation. To move from the punctiform mosaic of world-elements to a 
continuous, coherent physical system, we must complete experience with some form of 
hypothetical reasoning. But that reasoning must be natural, in Mach’s terms. It must complete 






3. Mathematics and Mach’s Principle 
The account in section 2 above appears to suggest the following way of reading Mach. Mach 
does not rule out a certain kind of hypothetical reasoning, “natural” hypothetical reasoning. And 
he does make a principled distinction between natural and artificial hypothetical reasoning, 
which should clear him of the charge of “abusive” empiricism. 
Nonetheless, it seems that Mach still does not allow for counterfactual mathematical reasoning, for 
which we might fault him. After all, Mach was among those engaged in debate over non-
Euclidean geometry in the nineteenth century, and he was well aware of the work of Eugenio 
Beltrami, Nikolai Lobachevsky, Hermann von Helmholtz, Bernhard Riemann, and Carl 
Friedrich Gauss. Mach’s principle is part of the background to relativity theory, but so are the 
advances in group theory, continuous transformations, non-Euclidean geometry, and allied fields. 
But these areas all involve robustly counterfactual reasoning – for instance, about the rigid 
motions possible for a body in certain circumstances, or the paths a body can take through space, 
or the different ways of determining metric relationships.  
In the above section, we saw that Mach’s account of scientific reasoning is based on the tension 
between “transitory unique events, arising and vanishing and possessing always an individual 
existence”, and “his view that space, time, and matter, however unreal they may be on a 
fundamental level, represent for Mach economical permanencies”. 17  Moreover, as Banks 
remarks, the observed elements for Mach are real, while spatiotemporal relationships are not 
(necessarily): “A full appreciation for Ernst Mach's doctrine of the economy of thought must take 
account of his direct realism about particulars (elements) and his anti-realism about space-time 
laws as economical constructions”.18 
Twenty years after the publication of the first edition of The Development of Mechanics, we find 
Mach engaging in an extended reflection on the distinction between physiological, physical, and 
metric space, in an essay for The Monist, “Space and Geometry from the Point of View of Physical 
Inquiry”.19  
Our notions of space are rooted in our physiological constitution. Geometric concepts are 
the product of the idealisation of physical experiences of space. Systems of geometry, 
finally, originate in the logical classification of the conceptual materials so gathered. All 
three factors have left their indubitable traces in modern geometry. Epistemological 
inquiries regarding space and geometry accordingly concern the physiologist, the 
psychologist, the physicist, the mathematician, the philosopher, and the logician alike, 
and they can be gradually carried to their definitive solution only by the consideration of 
the widely disparate points of view which are here offered.20 
Here, we find another aspect of Mach’s “economy” of science. “Economy” can refer to a way of 
minimizing or saving, as in effort, computation, or money. But it can refer equally well to a 
managed economy, in which there is a division of labor, for instance, within a society or 
community. As Schabas details, this latter notion of an economy had a broad currency by the 
end of the nineteenth century.21  
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Mach refers to the division of labor in the epistemology of space and of geometry. The physicist is 
concerned with what happens once: with the specific setup of an experiment, and with the 
observed phenomena of the world before us. The physiologist deals with how these Heraclitean 
sensations arise from an interaction between our physical constitution and the events in question. 
The geometer is not restricted to the private sphere of “individual intuitive space”, but can move 
freely from physiological to physical to metric space, which gives room for abstract and even 
counterfactual speculation.22 Such speculation is not robustly physical – Mach certainly spoke 
against it in some physical contexts. But in this essay, he argues that the division of labor in the 
epistemology of space allows the physicist to appreciate geometrical and hypothetical reasoning:  
It little accords with the principles of a physicist to make suppositions regarding the 
deportment of geometrical constructs in infinity and non-accessible places, then 
subsequently to compare them with our immediate experience and adapt them to it. He 
prefers… to regard what is directly given as the source of his ideas, which he considers 
applicable also to what is inaccessible until obliged to change them. But [the physicist] too 
may be extremely grateful for the discovery that there exist several sufficing geometries, 
that we can manage also with a finite space, etc. ,- grateful, in short, for the abolition of 
certain conventional barriers of thought (Mach, “Space and Geometry”, loc. cit., p. 1).   
The person who took trouble to type the words above, and then send them to Paul Carus for 
publication in The Monist, is not the Ernst Mach who allegedly opposed all counterfactual or 
abstract mathematical reasoning. But he is the Ernst Mach who wrote the chapter “On 
Experiments in Thought” in Knowledge and Error (1905). In this chapter, Mach emphasizes that  
the experiment in thought is a necessary precondition of the physical experiment. Each 
experimenter, each inventor must have the arrangement that led there in mind, before he 
translates it into action. Although [George] Stephenson also knew the train car, the track, 
and the steam engine from experience, he still had to model in thought the combination 
of a train car resting on the tracks driven by a steam engine before he could go on to 
execute it.  No less must Galileo see the arrangements of the investigation of falling 
motion in front of him in imagination before he implements them.23  
The physicist, the engineer, and the inventor must engage in robustly empirical reasoning. The 
dramatic narrative of the first chapters of Mach’s Development of Mechanics follows the failure of the 
search for a perpetual motion machine. A physicist – or an inventor! – who continues doggedly 
to build perpetual motion machines will fail. Mach is quite clear that that failure must be 
accepted, and that recognizing the fact of failure aids in the construction of future experiments 
and instruments. 
But Mach leaves room for truly imaginary counterfactual or hypothetical reasoning that makes 
no claim to be physical, or to work in practice. Galileo made experiments, and Stephenson made 
steam engines, that worked. In both cases, a dynamic mental model of how the experimental 
setup would be, or how the invention would work, was a “necessary precondition” of the 
experiment itself. But in “Space and Geometry” and in Knowledge and Error, Mach emphasizes that 
mathematicians can help physicists by freeing their imaginations from mental constraints that 
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restrict the construction of new models, abolishing “conventional barriers to thought”, and 
clearing the way for new methods. No harm is done, on Mach’s view, as long as the physicist, the 
physiologist, and the mathematician respect the epistemological division of labor.  
It is possible that between Mach’s pronouncements on Newton in 1883, and his essay on 
geometry for The Monist twenty years later, Mach had warmed to counterfactual and abstract 
reasoning. There are reasons why we might think so. As DiSalle (2003, 1993) details, Mach had 
learned much more about the mathematics of inertial frames and about relativity theory in the 
meantime, and he may have accepted that some abstract or counterfactual reasoning in this area 
was productive and even necessary.  
But it is also possible that Mach’s appreciation of one kind of counterfactual reasoning was in 
place already in 1883.24 Most of the classic experiments in thought from Poincaré, Helmholtz, 
Beltrami, and others that probed the metric structure of the universe (including Poincaré’s 
expanding gas universe, Helmholtz’s convex mirror, and Beltrami’s pseudosphere) were 
expressed in the 1860s and 1870s. In the introductory passages of his 1903 essay, Mach cites 
Riemann’s “Über die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen”, which was 
published in 1867 and given as a lecture in 1854; and letters from Gauss to Bessel from the 1820s 
and 1830s. Later he refers to Helmholtz’s “Ueber die Thatsachen, welche der Geometrie zu 
Grunde liegen”, which he cites as published in the Göttinger Nachrichten in 1868.25  
It is possible, of course, that Mach had been aware of these sources for decades but had 
recognized their true import only much later. But if we respect Mach’s division of labor for the 
epistemology of space, we might try to argue that his remarks in 1883 are coherent with the views 
expressed in 1903.  
Making the effort to find common ground between the “Mach” of the two time periods, the 
1880s and the early 1900s, is instructive.26 We can try to reconcile the two by recognizing that 
the Mach of the 1880s was reading the Newton of the bucket and two spheres experiments as a 
physicist, and not as a mathematician. Mach’s moralizing about the vocation of the physicist 
assigns to Newton the task of finding a way to implement his experiments in thought, just as 
Galileo and Stephenson had done. But Newton’s experiments in thought contain artificial 
elements that cannot be made empirical. Stephenson’s tracks, train cars, and engines can be 
made manifest; Newton’s absolute space drives no trains.  
What’s the difference between Riemann and Newton? Why does the Mach of the 1900s approve 
of Riemann’s investigations in thought, but not of Newton’s? Riemann took the object of his 
study to be the manifold itself. Thus, he was probing a universal geometrical concept. As Mach 
writes,  
By the recognition of permanency as coincident with spatial displacement, the various 
constituents of our intuition of space are rendered comparable with one another,—at first in 
the physiological sense. By the comparison of different bodies with one another, by the 
introduction of physical measures, this comparability is rendered quantitative and more 
exact... Thus, in the place of an individual and non-transmittable intuition of space are 
substituted the universal concepts of geometry, which hold good for all men. Each person 
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has his own individual intuitive space; geometric space is common to all. Between the 
space of intuition and metric space, which contains physical experiences, we must sharply 
distinguish (Mach, “Space and Geometry”, loc. cit., p. 2). 
According to Mach, Riemann’s metric space is based on comparison via physical 
measurements.27 But it is also “universal” and common to all experiences of space, and thus is a 
valid basis for abstract reasoning. Mach approves of Riemann because he keeps such reasoning 
within the appropriate realm in the managed economy of science. His arguments are 
mathematical – Riemann does not argue from the properties of metric space to the existence of a 
physical force, for instance.  
In the 1883 edition of The Development of Mechanics, Mach argues that Newton had made two 
errors. He made assertions about absolute space, a space not derived from comparison of 
observable phenomena and thus artificial. And he argued from the properties of artificial 
absolute space to the existence of a physical force.  
Later in his life, Mach modified his assessment of Newton himself, though not his assessment of 
the “monstrous conceptions” of absolute space and time.28 The Supplement to the third English 
edition of The Development of Mechanics contains Philip Jourdain’s transcription and translation of 
Mach’s revisions to the seventh German edition, published in 1912. Those revisions include a 
number of passages that provide context for Mach’s assessment of Newton’s bucket and two 
spheres experiments.  
while Galileo, in his theory of the tides, quite naively chose the sphere of the fixed stars as 
the basis of a new system of co-ordinates, we see doubts expressed by Newton as to 
whether a given fixed star is at rest only apparently or really (Principia, 1687, p. 11). This 
appeared to him to cause the difficulty of distinguishing between true (absolute) and 
apparent (relative) motion. By this he was also impelled to set up the conception of 
absolute space. By further investigations in this direction – the discussion of the 
experiment of the rotating spheres which are connected together by a cord and that of the 
rotating water-bucket (pp. 9, 11) – he believed that he could prove an absolute rotation... 
“But how we are to collect,” says Newton in the Scholium at the end of the Definitions, 
“the true motions from their causes, effects, and apparent differences, and vice versa; how 
from the motions, either true or apparent, we may come to the knowledge of their causes 
and effects, shall be explained more at large in the following Tract.” … do not the words 
quoted in inverted commas give the impression that Newton was glad to be able now to 
pass over to less precarious questions that could be tested by experience?29 
In the section following, Mach suggests that Newton was guided by empirical considerations in his 
postulation of absolute space. According to Mach, when Newton read Galileo on the principles 
of mechanics, Newton rejected Galileo’s use of the postulate of an earth at rest in the explanation 
of the law of inertia. Newton knew that the earth was rotating. Thus, instead, Newton “imagined 
a momentary terrestrial system of co-ordinates, for which the law of inertia is valid, held fast in 
space without any rotation relatively to the fixed stars”.30 He did so “in order to have a generally 
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valid system of reference” (Ibid.). Newton could assign a system “any initial position and any 
uniform translation relatively to the above momentary terrestrial system” (Ibid.).  
Mach emphasizes that the postulate of absolute space was not necessary, for Newton. In fact, as 
Mach observes, the reference system Newton constructs is relativist: it’s just that the target system 
is moving relative to the hypothetical terrestrial coordinate system. In making this move, Mach 
urges, “Newton was correctly led by the tact of the natural investigator. This is particularly to be 
noticed, since, in former editions of this book, it was not sufficiently emphasised. How far and 
how accurately the conjecture will hold good in future is of course undecided”.31 
What we might call “the Mach-Newton conjecture” is the question of whether all target systems 
can be defined relative to the terrestrial coordinate system defined by Newton, and whether the 
law of inertia is valid for all motions relative to such a reference system. It is an intriguing 
question whether this conjecture has been, or can be, empirically or mathematically verified.  
Mach concludes in this later edition that Newton was a good physicist, who gave a physically 
meaningful characterization of the law of inertia in terms of coordinate systems. The postulate of 
absolute space was not necessary for Newton. Instead, Mach suggests, Newton should have used 
only the formal apparatus necessary to give a “generally valid” characterization of inertial motion 
with respect to a system of coordinates. This would satisfy Mach’s law of continuity of experience, 
according to which gaps in the explanation of experience should be filled by the ideas suggested 
by experience.  
Newton’s use of a hypothetical terrestrial coordinate system is a nice example of Mach’s division 
of labor between physics and mathematics. When Newton is led to postulate absolute space, 
Mach accuses him of using an artificial concept and thus of engaging in artificial hypothetical 
reasoning. But the hypothesis of a terrestrial system at rest with respect to the fixed stars is an 
empirically possible hypothesis, and is a natural kind of hypothetical reasoning.  
Mach’s economy of science often is appealed to as a kind of minimization argument, or as an 
economy of thought or of effort. The above should cast significant doubt on any such reading of 
Mach on economy. Mach argues that reasoning that allows us to extend what’s observable and 
thus to promote the “continuity” of experience is economical.  
Mach allows even for hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning to contribute to the progress of 
science. It extends the circle of what is observable by appeal to what is accessible via well founded 
hypothetical reasoning. It is doubtful that Mach’s reasoning about the division of labor between 
mathematics, physics, and physiology can be supported in practice. But understanding Mach’s 
economy of science allows us to understand some of his more notorious arguments, including his 
polemics against absolute space and time.  
Finally, Mach’s philosophical reasoning is part of the recognized background to general relativity. 
The above account pushes against some of the more limited readings of Mach’s relativist theories 
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